NSC BRIEFING

2 March 1955

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I. Turks and Iraqis have agreed (pact signed 24 Feb. ratified by both parliaments 26 Feb.) "to co-operate for their security and defense." UK and US have both encouraged pact as first step in improved Middle East defense scheme.

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

- A. Egypt, Saudi Arabia both strongly hostile. Leaders believe new pact means loss personal and national prestige, decline in Egyptian, Saudi bargaining position with West.
 - 1. Prince Faisal (Saudi premier) has told Ambassador Wadsworth that US encouragement of pact set back Arab-American relations 30 years (Saudis may try to cancel Dhahran base agreement--due renewal Jun '56).

State Department review completed

B. Israelis, looking to future, fear pact
will mean more arms both for Iraq and
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for other Arab states which may ioin

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- 1. Spokesman stated: "...Treaty
 liable encourage Arab belligerent
 tendencies (toward) Israel."
- 2. Israelis also angered by joint
 Turk-Iraqi letter supporting UN
 Palestine resolutions (which
 whittle down Israeli territory,
 internationalize Jerusalem).
- 3. Actually, pact <u>could</u> be step toward ultimate settlement in Palestine.
 - a. Egyptian and Saudi opposition
 may bring collapse of Arab
 League (undyingly hostile to
 Israel).
 - b. Eventual involvement in broad

 planning for Middle East defense

 could reduce Arab preoccupation

 with Israel, thus easing tension.
- II. For present, however, rest of Arab weeks, upset by pact.
 - A. Jordan resentful, feeling "left out" of planning.

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Most critically of all, pact controversy

troubled Syria, where creeping deteri-

has acted as catalyst in already

oration over past year has divided nation into two mutually suspicious

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dent Atasi) also have some army support, look abroad to Iraq, Britain and US. They fear that Asali's neutralist regime is playing directly into hands of local Communists, USSR.

- They suspect that Syrian chief of staff Shuqayr is planning to seize power.
- 2. Claim Shuqayr would have help of French, who are anxious to preserve "special" economic and cultural position in country, strongly oppose Syrian alignment with Iraq.

 No proof of this either.
- C. Situation likely to worsen as both factions ready selves for August parliamentary Donnybrook on selection next Syrian president.
- 1. Asali's foreign minister--opportunistic, pro-French Khalid al Azm-wishes to become president. He supApproved For Releaser 2004/01/05a: GIA-RDRSQR01443R000300270004-7

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Arab Socialist Resurrectionist

Party (led by Akram Hawrani) and

Communists (led by Khalid Bakdash)

in 54 elections.

- 3. Syrian conservatives—now led by octogenarian President Atasi—have no candidate at present.
- D. Prospect for immediate future--Syria will sit indecisively in dead center of explosive situation.
 - Military coup has ample historic precedent, seems increasingly possible.
 - 2. However, cannot tell which of two factions may be first to move.